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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 92-CA-00332-SCT

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS; BROADCASTERS OF MISSISSIPPI,
INC. d/b/a WJTV; GANNETT RIVER STATES PUBLISHING
CORPORATION d/b/a THE CLARION LEDGER; LOWE
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY d/b/a  MISSISSIPPI NEWS
TONIGHT; NORTHSTAR TELEVISION OF JACKSON, INC.
d/b/a WAPT; AND TV-3, INC. d/b/a WLBT

v.

WILLIAM M. BOST, ESQ., IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN, MISSISSIPPI
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

BEFORE HAWKINS, C.J., PITTMAN AND BANKS, JJ.

BANKS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

 In this case we consider the validity of Canon 3(A)(7) of the
Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct which prevents cameras in
the courtroom except under specific circumstances. We find the
Canon to be constitutionally valid and fully operative in our
courtrooms. Until we have thoroughly researched the benefits
and ramifications of allowing cameras in our courtrooms, Canon
3(A)(7) will remain in full effect.

 I.

 Appellants (the press) are members of the news media who desire
to use cameras in Mississippi courtrooms to broadcast and cover
trials in accordance with Rule 8.06 of the Uniform Criminal
Rules of Circuit Court. Rule 8.06 provides that "[n]o cameras
or broadcasting will be permitted in the courtroom without the
prior written approval of the court." The press brings suit
against William Bost (Bost), in his official capacity as
chairman of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance,
seeking to invalidate Canon 3(a)(7) of the Mississippi Code of
Judicial Conduct which allows camera coverage only in specific
circumstances.

 This action was initiated after Judge L. Breland Hilburn
excluded cameras from the courtroom during the trial of Byron de
la Beckwith on November 12, 1991. We affirmed the court's
ruling after the press sought a writ of prohibition in the
matter. Thereafter, the press filed a complaint against Bost
for writ of prohibition, and in the alternative, a complaint for
injunctive relief or declaratory judgment in the circuit court
on December 12, 1991 seeking to prevent enforcement of Canon
3(A)(7). Bost moved for summary judgment. Granting Bost's
motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that "absent a
finding that Canon 3(A)(7) is invalid, there is no basis for
granting either a writ of prohibition or an injunction." The
court reasoned that the Supreme Court has the sole judicial
authority to promulgate procedural rules regarding the
administration of state courts. The court further reasoned that
while it is apparent that the Supreme Court adopted two separate
and conflicting rules pertaining to cameras in the courtroom,
the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to amend, suspend or
otherwise enjoin the operation of Canon 3(A)(7).

 Aggrieved, the press filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1992.

 II.

 The press argues that Canon 3(A)(7) conflicts with Rule 8.06 of
the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Because
the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice were
adopted by this Court in 1979, and the canons were adopted by
the Mississippi Conference of Judges in 1974, the press asserts
that the criminal rules should prevail in the event of conflict
because they were adopted last and were adopted by a superior
tribunal. Greenville School v. Western Line School, 575 So. 2d
956 (Miss. 1990). See also Jackson Municipal Airport Authority
v. Shivers, 206 So. 2d 190, 193 (Miss. 1968); Lamar County
School Board v. Saul, 359 So. 2d 350, 353 (Miss. 1978). Rule
8.06 was the later pronouncement by this Court on camera
coverage and should therefore control, argues the press.

 The press' argument is without merit. The language of Canon
3(A)(7) and Rule 8.06 do not conflict. We have held that the
doctrine of repeal by implication is not favored. Roberts v.
Miss. Rep. Party State Exec. Comm., 465 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Miss.
1985). Furthermore, statutes on the same subject, although in
apparent conflict, should be construed in harmony with each
other to give effect to each if possible. Id. at 1052.

 Rule 8.06 provides:

 No cameras or broadcasting will be permitted in the courtroom
without the prior written approval of the court.

 Cannon 3(A)(7) provides:

 A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or
taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately
adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between
sessions, except that a judge may authorize:

 (a) the use of electronic photographic means for the
presentation of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or
for other purposes of judicial administration;

 (b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of
investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;

 (c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of
appropriate court proceedings under the following conditions:

 (i) the means of recording will not distract participants or
impair the dignity of the proceedings;

 (ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being
depicted or recorded has been obtained from each witness
appearing in the recording and reproduction;

 (iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the
proceeding has been concluded and all direct appeals have been
exhausted; and

 (iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional
purposes in educational institutions.

 Rules 8.06 does not give the judge the absolute authority to
allow broadcasting in his courtroom. Reading Rule 8.06
harmoniously with Canon 3(A)(7), it merely provides that the
judge must give his written permission when allowing
broadcasting under the circumstances required in the Canon.
Thus, the press' argument that Canon 3(A)(7) was impliedly
repealed is without merit.

 Furthermore, Rule 8.06 has been revised effective May 1, 1995 to
avoid any further confusion with respect to courtroom
broadcasting. Rule 1.04 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and
County Court practice replaces Rule 8.06 and provides:

 There shall be no broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent
thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions,
except that the court may authorize the same in accordance with
the Code of Judicial Conduct.

 III.

 The press argues that it has been afforded a First Amendment
right to attend and report on public trials. Richmond
Newspapers v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576, 100
S. Ct. 2814, 2827, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1980). Canon 3(A(7),
asserts the press, not only unconstitutionally constrains and
limits its right to report, but also discriminates against
photojournalists and broadcasters.

 The press argues that Canon 3(A)(7) discriminates against
photojournalists and broadcasters (the electronic media) by
preventing them from adequately reporting the news. As a result
of this disparate treatment, argues the press, they are denied
equal protections of the laws as guaranteed under the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments. As authority for this position, the
press cites Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting, 518 F.
Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981) and Memphis Publishing Company v.
Leech, 539 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).

 Where an equal protection challenge is made to a state action in
a situation involving fundamental rights, the press asserts that
the rule of law challenged must survive strict scrutiny. San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct.
1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973). Because freedom of speech is a
fundamental right, the press argues that Canon 3(A)(7), as a
restriction on this freedom, can only survive strict scrutiny if
it is necessary to promote a compelling government interest.
The press contends that no compelling interest can be advanced
by the blanket denial of broadcasting and photographing trials
based upon overwhelming public interest in the judiciary, the
public's particular reliance on photographic news media to
report information about trials, and the innovative ability of
photographic and video technology to record proceedings with a
minimum of intrusion.

 The press also cites Billie Sol Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85
S. Ct. 1628, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1965) in support of its argument.
In Estes, portion of a defendant's trial were broadcasted and
the trial judge gave day-to-day orders concerning the manner in
which the trial could be televised. The defendant asserted that
he was denied his right to a fair trial because the daily
activities of television crews and photographers led to
considerable disruption of the hearings. Addressing equal
protection arguments, the court held:

 It is said however, that the freedoms granted in the First
Amendment extend to the news media to televise from the
courtroom, and that to refuse to honor this privilege is to
discriminate between the newspapers and television. This is a
misconception of the rights of the press...[the courts cannot]
be said to discriminate where they permit the newspaper reporter
access to the courtroom. The television and radio reporter has
the same privilege. All are entitled to the same rights as the
general public. The news reporter is not permitted to bring his
typewriter or printing press. When advances in these arts
permit reporting by printing or by television without present
hazards to a fair trial we will have another case.

 381 U.S. at 539-40, 85 S. Ct. at 1631, 14 L.Ed 2d at 548.

 The press asserts that the Supreme Court's holding in Estes with
regard to equal protection has been overruled by Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 101 S. Ct. 802, 66 L.Ed. 2d 740 (1981)
where the defendant complained that his due process rights were
violated by cameras in the courtroom. At issue was the legality
of a Florida Canon that permitted broadcast coverage of criminal
trials subject to the presiding judge's authority. The press
asserts the Supreme Court in Chandler held that "many of the
negative factors found in Estes -- cumbersome equipment, cables,
distracting lighting, numerous camera technicians -- are less
substantial factors today than at that time." 449 U.S. at 576,
101 S. Ct. at 810, 66 L.Ed. 2d at 752. The court upheld
Florida's Canon reasoning that the defendant failed to show
prejudice from courtroom media coverage, and that Estes did not
announce a constitutional rule that all photographic or
broadcast coverage is inherently a denial of due process.

 Because it is virtually no more obtrusive to utilize video and
still photography in court proceedings than it is to allow
attendance by print journalists, asserts the press, no rational
reason exists to prevent camera coverage of court proceedings.

 In the present case, the press' claim that Canon 3(A)(7) is
unconstitutional and violates its equal protection rights is
without merit. In determining whether a statute is violative of
the equal protection clause, we have stated:

 the United States Supreme Court has traditionally employed two
standards of review. (1) In the general field of social and
economic legislation, the Court has developed a low standard of
review, commonly known as the rational basis test. Under this
test a statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be
set aside as long as it is aimed at a permissible legislative
purpose and as long as it is based on some rational
justification to achieve the purpose intended. (2) Where,
however, legislation seeks to make certain classifications, most
notably on the basis of race, these classifications are
immediately suspect. The presumption of validity disappears and
applying rigid scrutiny, the state is placed under a heavy
burden to show a compelling state interest in justifying the
classification. Strict scrutiny review has also been applied
when a statute infringes upon a fundamental right.

 Rias v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 737, 738-39 (Miss. 1977)
(citations omitted). The question that must be addressed under
this analysis is whether the right to photograph and broadcast
inside the courtroom is a fundamental right so as to receive
strict scrutiny analysis, or whether it receives rational basis
review. The press fails to cite any authority indicating that
there is a fundamental right to broadcast from the courtroom.

 Freedom of the press and speech are fundamental rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Under the First Amendment,
the press and the public are guaranteed a right of access to
public trials in order to gather information, and report what
they see and hear. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575, 100 S.
Ct. 2826, 65 L.Ed. 2d 973. This constitutional right of speech
and the press is satisfied by allowing the press to attend the
trial and report what they have heard; however, there is no
constitutional right to have testimony recorded and broadcast.
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610, 98 S.
Ct. 1306, 1318, 55 L.Ed. 2d 570, 571 (1978); accord Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 569, 101 S. Ct. 802, 807, 66 L.Ed. 2d
740, 748 (1981). See also Petition of Post News Week Stations,
370 So. 2d at 774 (Fla. 1979); Combined Communications Corp. v.
Finesilver, 672 F. 2d 818, 821 (10th Cir. 1982); and US. v.
Hastings, 695 F. 2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983). The courts cannot be
said to discriminate where they grant the newspaper reporter
access to the courts because the television and radio reporter
have the same privilege. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 540, 85 S.
Ct. 1628 at 1631, 14 L.Ed. 2d at 548. Just as the newspaper
reporter is not allowed to bring his typewriter or printing
press into the courtroom, the electronic media is not allowed to
bring in their cameras and recording devices. Id.

 The press' assertion that Chandler overruled the equal
protection reasoning in Estes is mistaken. The statement in
Chandler that "many negative factors found in Estes...are
less substantial factors today than at the time," was an
argument made by the State of Florida in support of the Canon
allowing courtroom media coverage. It was not a statement, as
the press asserts, made by the Supreme Court itself in
recognition of innovative technology making courtroom coverage
less cumbersome, now was it a statement by the Court
substantiating due process arguments made by the electronic
media. Chandler only stands for the proposition that courtroom
broadcast coverage is not per se unconstitutional. However, as
the Eleventh Circuit observed, "just because television coverage
is not constitutionally prohibited does not mean that
television coverage is constitutionally mandated. Hastings, 695
F. 2d at 1280.

 Because Canon 3(A)(7) does not violate any fundamental
constitutional rights, it survives rational basis scrutiny. The
Canon passes muster because legitimate and rational reasons for
its existence include the state's interest in preserving order
and decorum, preserving the truth-seeking function of a trial,
and the protection of a defendant's rights. Hastings, 695 F. 2d
at 1283.

 IV.

 Asserting that canon 3(A)(7) is an impermissible time, place and
manner restriction on its First Amendment right to gather and
report information, the press argues that the trial court erred
when it failed to either grant a writ of prohibition,
injunction, or declaratory judgment against enforcement of the
Canon. The press cited the following authority indicating the
trial court's authority to grant either form of relief
requested: Vicksburg Waterworks Company v. Mayor and Alderman of
the City of Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 22 S. Ct. 585, 46 L.Ed. 808
(1902) (an injunction may issue where the damages would be
insufficient or irreparable) and State v. Maples, 402 So. 2d
350, 351 (Miss. 1991) writs of prohibition are available to
prevent some palpable injury).

 The press is entitled to the relief requested only if Canon
2(A)(7) is invalid or otherwise unjust. State v. Maples, 402
So. 2d 350, 351 (Miss. 1981) (the function of a writ covers
situations where the "superior court deems it necessary and
advisable to issue the writ to prevent some palpable and
irremediable injustice"); McGowan v. McCann, 357 So. 2d 946, 949
(Miss. 1978) (a court has the power to grant injunctive relief if
there is a reasonable probability that a real injury will occur,
and if the apprehension is well grounded). As the Canon is
neither unconstitutional, nor invalid, the press' argument must
fail.

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

 AFFIRMED.

 LEE AND PRATHER, P.JJ., SULLIVAN, PITTMAN AND ROBERTS, JJ.,
CONCUR. McRAE, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.  HAWKINS, C.J.,
SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH,
J.


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 92-CA-00332-SCT

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS; BROADCASTERS OF MISSISSIPPI,
INC. d/b/a WJTV; GANNETT RIVER STATES PUBLISHING
CORPORATION d/b/a THE CLARION LEDGER; LOWE
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY d/b/a  MISSISSIPPI NEWS
TONIGHT; NORTHSTAR TELEVISION OF JACKSON, INC.
d/b/a WAPT; AND TV-3, INC. d/b/a WLBT

v.

WILLIAM M. BOST, ESQ., IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN, MISSISSIPPI
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE


HAWKINS, CHIEF JUSTICE, SPECIALLY CONCURRING:

 I share with many members of the bench and bar a fear of the
deleterious impact of a television broadcast upon a fair and
impartial trial.  Television broadcasting is awesomely powerful
in affecting public opinion.  The fact that a trial is being
televised surely has an impact on those being viewed, and its
impact upon the public can hardly be exaggerated.  Snippets
broadcast on news programs are hardly likely to give the viewer
a balanced view of the proceedings, and few viewers have the
time or opportunity to sit and watch the entire proceedings on
television, even if the entire trial is broadcast.  I have a
genuine concern whether a defendant's constitutional right to
a fair trial is adversely affected by being televised.  Until
such time as it can be demonstrated that publicly televising a
trial has no adverse impact upon the accused's right to a fair
trial, I would uphold Canon 3(A)(7) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

 I cannot, however, buy the argument that a television reporter
is denied the right to bring his camera in the courtroom is not
being discriminated against because the newspaper reporter
cannot bring his typewriter into the courtroom, either.  That is
about like saying to the newspaper reporter that he cannot bring
a pad and a pencil into the courtroom.  or, if the reporter could
take shorthand or stenotype, he could not do that, either, in the
courtroom.  In my view, to pass constitutional muster there must
be some showing that the fact that the trial is being televised
has an adverse impact on the courtroom participants or presents a
danger of adversely affecting public opinion of the accused in
such a manner as to deny him a fair trial.  It cannot
constitutionally be excluded because of cumbersome equipment
interfering with the proceedings, which clearly present day
cameras do not, nor the tenuous argument that a television
reporter is not being denied any right because he, himself, is
free to sit in the courtroom and take notes of the proceedings.

 The constitutional right of freedom of the press covers
television reporters as well, and the serious question presented
by this case is not going to go away.

 SMITH, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.